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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201(a): Order of attachment vacated because right to
receive rent income held contingent.
Under CPLR 6202, any debt against which a money judgment
may be enforced under CPLR 5201 is also subject to attachment.
According to CPLR 5201(a), a money judgment may be enforced
against any debt which is yet to become due, certainly or upon
demand of the judgment debtor. The requirement that the debt
be "certain" is thereby made applicable to attachable property.
It is well settled that a debt is not attachable unless it is
absolutely payable at present or in the future and not subject to any
contingency.69
In a recent case, Glassman v. Hyder,0 the court examined the
acquisition of quasi in rem jurisdiction by the attachment of a
tenant's obligation to the defendants for the payment of rent on a
twenty-year lease. In granting the defendants' motion to vacate
the order of attachment, the court held that since no debt was
presently due, and since the payment of future rents was contingent,
there was no valid attachment.
It could be argued that a lease is less contingent and more
valuable than most future contractual debts. Usually, the act of
executing the lease constitutes substantial performance on the part
of the landlord who then may only be required to perform minor
duties. The tenant will be obligated upon the lease for continu-
ing payments regardless of his occupation of the premises. Never-
theless, this decision seems to be consistent with precedent indicating
that if a contractual obligation is contingent in any respect, it is not
attachable under CPLR 5201 and 6202. ; '
It is submitted that part of the future rent income could
perhaps be attachable under CPLR 5231. According to this section,
where a judgment debtor will receive more than thirty dollars per
week from any person, execution is allowable up to ten per cent
of such income. The Advisory Committee's notes indicated an
intent to exempt income execution under CPLR 5231 from the
requirement that the obligation be "certain." 72 Although CPLR
5231 refers only to execution, it was held in Cohen v. Carl M. Loeb,
69 Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 266 N.Y. 44, 193 N.E. 633
(1934); Dutch-American Mercantile Corp. v. Safticraft, 17 App. Div. 2d
421, 234 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1st Dep't 1962) ; Frederick v. Chicago Bearing Metal
Co., 221 App. Div. 588, 224 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1st Dep't 1927).
70 51 Misc. 2d 535, 273 N.Y.S.Zd 385 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966).
716 WmNsTm , KORNT & M=L. R, NEW YoRx Crvm PRAcrics 5201.04
(1965). But see, Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).72 THIRD REP. 101.
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Rhoades & Co.,73 that future trust income, despite its contingent
nature, could also be attachable to the extent of ten per cent.
If such a result could be reached with respect to trust income,
it also could occur with rent income, since CPLR 5231 covers income
received from "any person."
However, a possible implied statutory limitation to this section
might be found in CPLR 5205(e) (1) and (2) which exempt
ninety per, cent of certain trust income and earnings from personal
services from the satisfaction of a money judgment. The ten per
cent eligibility under CPLR 5231 and the ninety per cent exemption
under CPLR 5205(e) (1) and (2) could be interpreted as making
the two sections coordinate, and thereby impliedly limiting CPLR
5231 to trust income and personal earnings. Although courts have
construed CPA § 684,7' the predecessor of CPLR 5231, liberally
in its application to trust income and various types of compensation
for personal service,75 they have not extended its coverage beyond
these areas.
If rental income is made attachable to the extent of ten per
cent, by the same reasoning, other types of income could be attach-
able under CPLR 5231. Such an interpretation of this section
might encourage contract breaches on the part of a defendant,
so that the plaintiff's attachment would become valueless. How-
ever, this tendency could also -occur in connection with employment
contracts which are presently within the scope of CPLR 5231.
Furthermore, this tendency would be minimized because of the
liability resulting from such breach.
There are instances where the right to receive continuing pay-
ments, subject to certain minor contingencies, is more valuable than
a debt which is "certain" though difficult or impossible to collect,
A construction of the CPLR which would permit attachment of
such substantial property rights, where this process is the only basis
of securing jurisdiction, would be highly desirable.
73 48 Misc. 2d 159, 264 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). This
case is treated in The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST.
Jo N's L. REv. 121, 153-55 (1966). See also Morris Plan Industrial Bank v.
Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E.2d 510 (1946).
r CPA § 684 provided for a levy upon "any wages, debts, earnings,
salary, income from trust funds or profits. .. ."
75See, e.g., William F. Kasting Co. v. Whittle, 174 App. Div. 224, 159
N.Y. Supp. 909 (3d Dep't 1916); Burns v. Maurer, 72 Misc. 481, 131 N.Y.
Supp. 344 (Erie County Ct 1911).
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